The Skunk
Law Reporter

Suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacity may proceed despite sovereign immunity.

Criminal civil-rights liability (18 U.S.C. § 242) requires willful deprivation of a constitutional right — the foundation of federal color-of-law prosecutions.

Opened the modern § 1983 era: officers acting under color of law are suable in federal court even when their conduct also violates state law.

Implied a damages remedy against federal officers for Fourth Amendment violations — since sharply limited (see Ziglar v. Abbasi below).

Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for advocacy functions in initiating and presenting the State's case — the wall every plaintiff must plan around.

Municipalities are 'persons' under § 1983 — liable when an official policy or custom causes the violation, never on respondeat superior alone.

A warrant obtained through deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth in the affidavit violates the Fourth Amendment — the 'Franks hearing.'

Municipalities get no qualified immunity — a city is liable for its unconstitutional policies even if enacted in good faith.

The modern qualified-immunity standard: officials are shielded unless they violate clearly established rights a reasonable person would have known.

§ 1983 claims borrow the forum state's personal-injury statute of limitations (Oklahoma: two years, 12 O.S. § 95(A)(3)). Calendar it first.

An officer who seeks a warrant no reasonably competent officer would have requested loses qualified immunity — the companion to Franks.

Failure-to-train liability where the need for training is so obvious that inaction amounts to deliberate indifference.

States and state officials sued in official capacity for damages are not § 1983 'persons' — sue individuals in their individual capacity.

A § 1983 damages claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a standing conviction is barred until the conviction is set aside — the Heck bar.

Fair-warning standard for criminal color-of-law liability: prior cases need not be fundamentally similar, only give reasonable warning.

Officials can be on notice their conduct violates the Constitution even in novel factual circumstances — obvious cruelty needs no identical precedent.

Courts may decide qualified immunity on either prong in either order — flexibility that often skips the merits question.

Single-incident failure-to-train claims against DA offices face a steep hill: a pattern of similar violations is usually required.

Pretrial detainees need only show force was objectively unreasonable — no subjective intent requirement.

Pretrial detention without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment even after legal process begins.

Expanding Bivens is 'disfavored' — new-context federal-officer damages claims will almost always fail. Plan § 1983 state-actor theories instead.

Fabricated-evidence claims accrue when the criminal proceedings terminate in the accused's favor — the clock starts at favorable termination.

Qualified immunity denied without a prior identical case where conditions were obviously unconstitutional — a rare summary reversal in the plaintiff's favor.

Application of physical force with intent to restrain is a Fourth Amendment seizure even if the person escapes — shooting a fleeing suspect 'seizes' her.

Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims require only that the prosecution ended without a conviction — no affirmative proof of innocence needed. The modern gateway for wrongful-charge suits.

The exclusionary rule binds the states: evidence from unconstitutional searches is suppressed in state court.

The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places — reasonable expectation of privacy became the touchstone.

Stop-and-frisk on reasonable articulable suspicion — the doctrine governing nearly every street encounter since.

Warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a home to make a routine felony arrest is presumptively unconstitutional — the threshold of the home is the line.

Probable cause is judged under the totality of the circumstances — the flexible standard for warrant affidavits and informant tips.

Deadly force against a fleeing suspect requires probable cause of a significant threat — you cannot shoot every fleeing felon.

All excessive-force claims in arrests are judged by Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness — the universal use-of-force standard.

A judicial probable-cause determination generally must come within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest.

An officer's subjective motive doesn't invalidate a stop supported by probable cause for a traffic violation — the pretext-stop rule to litigate around.

Passengers are seized during a traffic stop and may challenge its legality.

Police-created exigency doctrine: officers may rely on exigent circumstances they did not create by violating the Fourth Amendment.

Alcohol dissipation alone is not a per se exigency — warrantless blood draws need case-by-case justification.

A drug dog on the front porch is a search: the curtilage is protected, and an implied license to knock is not a license to sniff.

No warrantless cell-phone searches incident to arrest — 'get a warrant.' The digital-privacy landmark.

A traffic stop may not be prolonged beyond its mission — even briefly — to conduct a dog sniff without independent suspicion.

Discovery of a valid arrest warrant may attenuate the taint of an unlawful stop — know the exception when litigating suppression.

A driver in lawful possession of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy even if unlisted on the agreement.

The automobile exception does not permit entry into the curtilage of a home to search a vehicle parked there.

Accessing historical cell-site location records is a search requiring a warrant — the third-party doctrine has digital limits.

No freestanding 'community caretaking' exception justifies warrantless home entries.

Pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant does not categorically justify warrantless home entry — exigency is case-by-case.

The prosecutor's creed: the government's interest 'is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done' — he may strike hard blows, but not foul ones.

A conviction obtained through testimony the prosecution knows to be false — or leaves uncorrected — violates due process.

The prosecution must disclose material exculpatory evidence — the disclosure obligation every defendant should invoke by name.

Indigent defendants in state felony cases have a right to appointed counsel — the Sixth Amendment's floor.

Custodial interrogation requires warnings of the rights to silence and counsel; unwarned statements are inadmissible in the case-in-chief.

The jury-trial right applies to the states for serious offenses — trial by jury is fundamental to American justice.

Due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to the crime charged.

Deals and promises to government witnesses are Brady material — impeachment evidence must be disclosed.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of self-representation — the constitutional charter of every pro se defendant.

Hard plea bargaining — threatening greater charges to induce a plea — survives due process review. Know the leverage you face.

Sufficiency review asks whether any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt viewing evidence favorably to the verdict.

Ineffective-assistance claims require deficient performance plus prejudice — the two-prong test governing every IAC petition.

Standby counsel may assist, but the pro se defendant must retain actual control over his own defense — the jury must perceive him as representing himself.

Race-based peremptory strikes violate equal protection — the three-step Batson challenge.

Brady materiality is judged by the cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence, and the prosecutor is responsible for evidence known to police.

Any fact increasing the penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Testimonial hearsay is barred unless the witness is unavailable and there was prior opportunity for cross-examination — the modern Confrontation Clause.

The federal Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory — sentencing courts must consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as a whole.

The right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance before a magistrate — not when the prosecutor gets involved.

States may insist on counsel for defendants competent to stand trial but not to represent themselves — the limit on Faretta.

Counsel may not concede guilt over the client's express objection — the accused, not the lawyer, owns the objective of the defense.

The Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts for serious offenses in state court.

Judicial immunity is absolute for judicial acts not taken in clear absence of all jurisdiction — the wall around the bench, and why claims must target non-judicial acts.

Prosecutorial vindictiveness: upping charges after a defendant exercises appeal rights raises a due-process presumption of vindictiveness.

Absolute prosecutorial immunity covers the advocate's role — initiating and presenting the case — but not everything a prosecutor does.

Judicial immunity did not bar prospective injunctive relief or § 1988 fees — later limited by the 1996 FCIA (injunctions now require violated declaratory decrees). Cite with its statutory history.

Release-dismissal agreements — dropping charges in exchange for waiving civil-rights claims — are enforceable only if voluntary and free of prosecutorial misconduct. The case to know when freedom is traded for silence.

Dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury requires prejudice — the harmless-error frame for grand-jury abuse claims.

Even malicious or excessive judicial acts (ordering officers to seize an attorney with force) stay immune if 'judicial in nature' — plead around the function, not the motive.

Prosecutors acting as investigators — fabricating evidence before probable cause exists, or making press statements — get only qualified immunity.

Selective-prosecution claims require clear evidence of discriminatory effect and intent — the demanding threshold for discovery.

A prosecutor who personally swears to facts in a warrant application acts as a witness, not an advocate — and loses absolute immunity for those attestations.

Administrative failures intertwined with trial advocacy (information systems on informants) remain absolutely immune — how far Imbler stretches.

Prisons cannot bar jailhouse lawyers from helping fellow inmates prepare petitions absent reasonable alternatives — the writ-writer's charter.

Due process bars fee barriers that close the only forum for fundamental matters (divorce) to those who cannot pay.

Pro se pleadings are held 'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers' — cite it on page one of every pro se filing.

The right to conduct one's own defense is personal and constitutional. The foundation of this entire platform.

Prisoners have a right of access to the courts — adequate law libraries or legal assistance are the historic remedy.

Access-to-courts claims require actual injury — a frustrated, nonfrivolous claim — not just a bad library. Plead the lost claim.

Reaffirmed liberal construction for pro se complaints post-Twombly — a short and plain statement suffices.

Civil contempt with jail exposure requires alternative procedural safeguards where counsel isn't provided — protections for unrepresented parties facing incarceration.

The house citation: a pro se defendant, convicted under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848, obtained a published Tenth Circuit decision on appeal — proof in the reporter volumes that a self-represented litigant can move a federal appellate court.

Federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law — there is no general federal common law.

Personal jurisdiction requires minimum contacts such that suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Leave to amend 'shall be freely given when justice so requires' — the authority to cite when seeking to fix a defective pleading.

Foreseeability alone doesn't create jurisdiction; the defendant must purposefully avail itself of the forum. (An Oklahoma case, fittingly.)

Summary judgment mirrors the trial burden: a 'genuine' dispute requires evidence on which a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant.

The movant may win summary judgment by showing the nonmovant lacks evidence on an essential element — respond with record evidence, not allegations.

Implausible claims require more persuasive evidence to survive summary judgment — the third leg of the 1986 trilogy.

Courts hold inherent power to sanction bad-faith litigation conduct beyond the rules — behave, and paper your good faith.

Trial judges gatekeep expert testimony for reliability and fit — the standard for challenging junk science.

Complaints must plead enough facts to state a claim 'plausible on its face' — labels and conclusions are not enough.

The four-factor preliminary-injunction standard: likely success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, public interest.

Twombly's plausibility standard governs all civil cases; conclusory allegations are disregarded. Draft facts, not adjectives.