IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA

DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF TO WITHDRAW PLEA OUT-OF-TIME AND MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON THE SUPREME COURT MANDATE IN HUNTER V. UNITED STATES

COMES NOW, David Bruce McDermott II, appearing Pro Se, and moves this Court to vacate his May 1, 2026 plea agreement and dismiss this case with prejudice based on Hunter v. United States (June 18, 2026). The 8-1 ruling holds that plea waivers are void if they produce a "miscarriage of justice" by leaving in place egregious errors, such as prosecutions barred by the statute of limitations.

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF UNDER HUNTER V. UNITED STATES

Time-Barred Prosecution: The state charged a 2020 incident in late 2025, long after the three-year statute of limitations expired, violating fundamental jurisdictional rules.

The Probable Cause Affidavit and Arrest Warrant Were Void on Their Face: Scribble Signatures, No Judicial Identification, and Deliberate Concealment in Violation of Oklahoma Statutory Law and the Fourth Amendment

April 18, 2026 Theatrical Million Dollar Bond Demand, Judicial Misconduct, and the Constitutional Collapse of Due Process

Extortionate Plea Condition: The plea was obtained under duress by threatening continued "No Bond" status unless the Defendant dropped federal civil rights claims.

Miscarriage of Justice: Enforcing a waiver under these conditions constitutes a systemic failure and an "egregious error" that brings the judiciary into disrepute, a direct violation of the Hunter standard.

Facts and Circumstances

Since 1998, Defendant has established that Defendant has been a public speaker, writer, and videographer who challenges and brings light to individuals within state and federal government who abuse their official and/or judicial authority.

In 2010, Defendant took to the social media platform Facebook to continue speaking publicly on topics ranging from everyday life to government misconduct.

On or about 2017, Defendant became aware that Ethan Mulkey had become increasingly active in Defendant's neighborhood. Mr. Mulkey had developed a close friendship with neighbors residing at the end of Defendant's Disney Road driveway. During this period, Defendant learned that both Mr. Mulkey and this neighbor were employed as Okmulgee County Sheriff's Deputies. Around this same time, Deputy Mulkey began pulling Defendant over with unusual frequency, making these encounters a regular occurrence.

On or about May 7th, 2017, Deputy Mulkey was parked at the end of 185 Road, facing south with the rear of his patrol car facing north, positioned in a driveway just off Creeger Road. He had been watching Defendant and Keith Claxton live on Facebook. Claxton had gone to Duck Creek Casino to pick up Defendant's dinner. As Claxton approached Creeger Road and stopped at the sign, Deputy Mulkey was directly across from him. Suddenly, Claxton turned right onto 231, heading eastbound. Immediately thereafter, Deputy Mulkey pulled from his parked position and initiated a traffic stop on Claxton. This moment marked the beginning of a unique and troubling pattern between Defendant and Deputy Mulkey.

Deputy Mulkey immediately accused Claxton of driving under the influence. Deputy Mulkey then allowed Claxton to contact Defendant using one of the cell phones in Claxton's possession. When Defendant answered, the first words out of Deputy Mulkey's mouth were: "David, when was the last time you smoked crack?" From the back of the patrol car, Claxton attempted to explain the situation. Defendant asked Deputy Mulkey to release Claxton and not charge him with DUI because Claxton was not impaired. Deputy Mulkey responded that it did not matter whether Claxton was DUI or not, stating: "They're only going to believe what I say over you two." Claxton was arrested and taken to jail. His case did not go to trial until April 1st, 2019.

Beginning May 7th, 2017, after Deputy Mulkey stated he could lie and be believed over Defendant and Claxton, Defendant began producing a series of Facebook Live videos exposing Deputy Mulkey's conduct. These videos gained significant traction. The videos became so widely viewed that Sheriff Eddie Rice of Okmulgee County instructed his entire department to stop watching Defendant's Facebook Live videos while on taxpayer time. This was later confirmed when Okmulgee County Deputy Gerry Mantex appeared at a child custody hearing attended by Defendant and explained that deputies were no longer permitted to watch Defendant's videos "on the clock."

The videos were intense, direct, and accusatory. They became a source of entertainment for some deputies and a source of discomfort for others. The videos attracted viewers from surrounding counties, from Tulsa to Oklahoma City, and even federal agents with the United States Department of Justice, both within Oklahoma and in other states. Defendant's broadcasts became a phenomenon, consuming significant attention across multiple law enforcement communities.

On April 1st, 2019, after Deputy Mulkey lied in the trial of State of Oklahoma v. Keith Troy Claxton and Claxton was convicted, Defendant became infuriated. Defendant then launched an entirely new series of Facebook Live videos targeting Deputy Mulkey and the Okmulgee County Sheriff's Department. Defendant described Mulkey as a liar, a criminal, a danger to the public, and an officer willing to lie under oath. Defendant maintains that every allegation made in those videos is provable. Despite this, Deputy Mulkey was allowed to continue working, continue making arrests without probable cause, and continue filing reports based on false facts and fabricated circumstances.

These new videos drew even more attention. Facebook analytics showed broad and diverse viewership, and the videos became widely discussed among Oklahoma law enforcement.

On April 1st, 2019, the trial began for Claxton's alleged DUI. Defendant arrived at the trial just in time to see Deputy Mulkey testify. Deputy Mulkey lied throughout his account of the stop, and Claxton was convicted based on those falsehoods and sentenced to 60 days in jail.

On December 30, 2025, a felony stalking warrant was issued against Defendant based solely on Facebook posts criticizing Officer Ethan Mulkey. On January 4, 2026, Defendant was arrested in Florida, extradited to Oklahoma, and held without bond. Defendant remained in jail for five months with no meaningful bond hearing and was threatened with continued detention if Defendant continued attempting to expose these matters to USDOJ PI CID.

April 2, 2026 – Motions Filed

Defendant filed: • Entry of Appearance • Motion to Proceed Pro Se • Motion to Dismiss • Speedy Trial Demand • Motion for Pretrial Release • Notice of Civil Claims • Notice to Challenge Accuser Credibility All were set for hearing on April 29, 2026.

On April 18, 2026, at Defendant's bail hearing, Defendant was portrayed as a danger to society, including a claim that Defendant attacked a man in the extradition van. That claim is false. Defendant was the one attacked and intends to sue the transport company for lying to the District Attorney's Office and enabling her assistant to make a false claim to deny bond. The fact that Defendant was suddenly no longer considered a threat on May 1, 2026, when a plea was desired, raises serious questions.

On or about May 20th, 2026, after Defendant's release from jail and once Defendant had a stable environment to review all charging documents, Defendant conducted a comprehensive examination of every record associated with the case. Through this review — including AI assisted analysis — Defendant discovered that the primary basis used to portray Defendant as a violent individual was stale, extraterritorial, and time barred information originating from a September 4th, 2020 email sent to Missouri Highway Patrol Captain Scott Shipers.

Even if the September 4th, 2020 email could be construed as criminal (which it cannot), any such offense would have occurred in Missouri, not Oklahoma. The statement was: • Five years old, • Outside Oklahoma's jurisdiction, and • Barred by the three year statute of limitations under 22 O.S. § 152.

The email contained a hyperbolic figure of speech — a rhetorical expression about "ripping someone's head off and defecating down their neck." Under Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), hyperbolic political or emotional rhetoric is not a true threat. No reasonable person would interpret such language literally. Only through selective framing by the Oklahoma Highway Patrol investigator and for the convenience of Ethan Mulkey does the affidavit attempt to convert this stale expression into a present day source of fear. The evidence now shows that this "fear" was manufactured.

Constitutional Memorandum Summary

The constitutional memorandum provides a detailed analysis of the Information filed in CF 2025 708, identifying: • Facial defects in the charging instrument • Expired evidentiary windows • Structural failure of probable cause • Jurisdictional defects • First Amendment violations

The Fatal Timeliness Defect of the "Rip Your Head Off" Statement

When the Information is stripped of time barred, extraterritorial, and constitutionally protected material, it fails to meet Oklahoma's probable cause standard. Under 21 O.S. § 1173, felony stalking requires: • A willful, malicious, repeated course of conduct • Directed at a specific person • That would cause a reasonable person to fear physical harm

The 2025 Charging Window Contains No Criminal Acts

1. Administrative Complaints to OHP Defendant's calls and texts to OHP Lt. Dobbs were petitions for redress of grievances, protected under the First Amendment and Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011). Such communications cannot form a criminal "course of conduct."

2. Public Facebook Commentary The 59 Facebook posts criticizing a public officer's conduct are core political speech, protected under Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), which holds that citizens have a constitutional right to criticize police without fear of arrest. The State identifies no true threat, no incitement, and no unlawful act within these posts. Thus, the Information lacks any factual basis to establish probable cause.

Time Barred and Out of State Conduct Cannot Be Used

• The 2020 Missouri email is barred by 22 O.S. § 152. • The 2019–2022 conduct occurred outside Oklahoma's jurisdiction. • Oklahoma courts cannot rely on extraterritorial acts to establish elements of a state offense. See State v. Hall, 2017 OK CR 15.

Once this invalid material is removed, the only remaining conduct is protected 2025 speech. Under Houston v. Hill, officers must tolerate public hostility and cannot weaponize criminal statutes to silence critics. Therefore, the Information fails to state a triable offense.

The Fatal Timeliness Defect of the "Rip Your Head Off" Statement

The probable cause affidavit — sworn by OHP Investigator Jordy Woolsey — relies heavily on the inflammatory September 4th, 2020 statement allegedly emailed to Missouri Highway Patrol Major Scott Shipers. The affidavit claims Defendant said: "Get the fuck out of my way… I'll rip your goddamn head off and shit down your neck…"

1. Time Barred Under 22 O.S. § 152 and Outside Oklahoma Jurisdiction • Statement made: September 4, 2020 • Information filed: December 30, 2025 • Time elapsed: 5 years, 3 months Under 22 O.S. § 152, the statute of limitations for general felonies is three years. Therefore, the statement cannot be used as a criminal act. Additionally, the statement occurred in Missouri, placing it outside Oklahoma's subject matter jurisdiction. Oklahoma cannot prosecute conduct occurring wholly in another state. See State v. Hall, supra.

2. No "Course of Conduct" Under 21 O.S. § 1173 The State attempts to artificially connect the 2020 statement to administrative complaints made in 2024–2025. This fails under the statutory definition of "course of conduct," which requires: • A series of two or more acts, • Over a period of time, • Evidencing continuity of purpose.

The State's own timeline destroys continuity: • Act A: September 4, 2020 (Missouri) • Gap: Over three years of no contact, no threats, no communication • Act B: March 9, 2024 / January 16, 2025 (administrative complaints)

A nearly four year gap cannot form a continuous pattern. The 2020 statement is an isolated, time barred, extraterritorial event being improperly dragged into a 2025 case to manufacture fear and fabricate statutory elements that the 2025 evidence cannot support.

This violates: • Watts v. United States — hyperbole ≠ true threat • Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) — true threats require intent to place another in fear • Houston v. Hill — police cannot criminalize criticism • Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) — offensive speech is protected

Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Discovery of Stale Evidence

The prosecution of Case No. CF 2025 708 began with a fundamental defect: the State relied on information that was not only stale, but legally dead, time barred, and constitutionally unusable. The charging document filed on December 30, 2025 alleged a "course of conduct" occurring between January 1, 2025 and December 30, 2025. Yet the affidavit supporting the Information relied heavily on a single statement allegedly made on September 4, 2020 — more than five years earlier, in another state, and outside the statute of limitations by more than two full years.

The discovery of this stale information was not immediate. After release from jail, and only once a stable environment allowed for a full review of the charging documents, it became clear that the State had anchored its entire theory of criminality to a statement that could not lawfully be used for any purpose. The September 4, 2020 video email sent to Missouri Highway Patrol Major Scott Shipers was not part of the 2025 charging window, did not occur in Oklahoma, and was barred by the three year statute of limitations under 22 O.S. § 152. Even if the statement had been criminal — which it was not — it expired as a matter of law long before the Information was filed.

The prosecution's reliance on this statement represents a profound failure of basic legal research. The State either did not examine the timeline, or examined it and proceeded anyway. Both possibilities are equally troubling.

The law is unequivocal: stale evidence cannot support probable cause. The United States Supreme Court in Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932), held that probable cause must be based on facts "so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time." Oklahoma courts have adopted this rule without deviation. In Giles v. State, 685 P.2d 399 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984), the Court of Criminal Appeals reaffirmed that stale information cannot establish probable cause under Article II, § 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

The prosecution's theory collapses under its own timeline. A five year old statement cannot create present day fear. A five year old statement cannot establish continuity of purpose. A five year old statement cannot be revived to manufacture a "course of conduct" where none exists. The State's attempt to stretch a single, isolated, time barred remark across half a decade to justify a 2025 felony charge is not merely defective — it is unconstitutional.

The State compounded this error by criminalizing protected speech. The Information alleges that the defendant made "slanderous comments" about Trooper Ethan Mulkey, including administrative complaints to OHP Lieutenant Sheldon Dobbs and a brief Facebook exchange initiated by Mulkey's own wife. These communications fall squarely within the First Amendment. The Supreme Court in Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023), held that the State must prove a subjective mental state — at least recklessness — before speech can be criminalized as a true threat. Administrative complaints, whistleblowing, and public commentary do not meet this standard. They are protected expressions of grievance and oversight.

The prosecution's failure to distinguish between protected speech and criminal conduct reflects a deeper problem: the State did not investigate its own "victim." Had the prosecution conducted even a minimal review of Trooper Ethan Ray Mulkey's history, they would have discovered a pattern of misconduct, civil rights complaints, excessive force allegations, and federal litigation spanning years. Instead, the State accepted Mulkey's narrative without scrutiny and built a felony case on a foundation of stale evidence, protected speech, and a deeply compromised complainant.

This prosecutorial failure set the stage for the next constitutional breakdown: the judicial rubber stamping of a warrant that no neutral magistrate could lawfully sign.

The Probable Cause Affidavit and Arrest Warrant Were Void on Their Face: Scribble Signatures, No Judicial Identification, and Deliberate Concealment in Violation of Oklahoma Statutory Law and the Fourth Amendment

Overview: The Arrest Warrant Contained No Judge's Name, No Judicial Identification, and Only an Illegible Scribble.

The probable cause affidavit and arrest warrant used to arrest and detain me for five months were void on their face. Both documents contained: • no printed name of the judge • no typed name of the judge • no signature block • no judicial title • no identification whatsoever of the issuing magistrate

Instead, both documents contained nothing more than a single, illegible scribble above the words "Judge of Muskogee Court." That is not a signature. That is not identification. That is not judicial authorization. That is not lawful.

Under Oklahoma law, federal law, and the Fourth Amendment, a warrant must identify the judicial officer who issued it. A scribble with no name is not a warrant — it is a nullity.

Oklahoma Law Requires the Judge's Name to Appear on the Warrant.

Oklahoma statutes are explicit and leave no room for interpretation.

1. 22 O.S. § 1223 — A Warrant Must Be Signed and Must Identify the Magistrate. The statute requires that a warrant: • "be signed by the magistrate," and • "contain the name of the magistrate issuing it." Defendants warrant contained neither. A scribble is not a signature. A scribble is not a name. A scribble does not satisfy § 1223.

2. 22 O.S. § 1224 — The Warrant Must Show Judicial Authority The statute further requires that a warrant: • "state the magistrate's official title," and • "show that it was issued by lawful authority." Your warrant did neither.

3. 12 O.S. § 2902 — Authentication of Official Documents Oklahoma law requires that judicial documents be: • "capable of verification," and • "authenticated by the officer whose act it purports to be." A scribble with no name is not capable of verification.

Oklahoma Case Law.

Oklahoma courts have repeatedly held that: • a warrant must be signed, • the judge must be identifiable, and • the issuing authority must be verifiable. A warrant that does not identify the judge is void.

The Fourth Amendment Requires a Neutral and Detached Magistrate — and That Magistrate Must Be Identifiable

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, and that the identity of that magistrate must be clear. Cases include: Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) Lo Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979)

A warrant with no identifiable judge cannot be reviewed, challenged, authenticated, verified, or presumed valid. It is constitutionally void.

The Warrant Was Deliberately Concealed: No Judge Wanted Their Name on It

This was not an accident. This was not a clerical error. This was not oversight. This was intentional concealment.

After Defendants release, he had to manually compare the scribble on my warrant to published judicial signatures to determine that the issuing judge was more likely than not Judge Orvil Loge, a former Muskogee County District Attorney.

That fact is damning. It shows: • no judge wanted their name on this warrant • no judge wanted to be associated with this case • no judge wanted to be accountable • the issuing judge intentionally hid his identity • the DA's office intentionally submitted a warrant with no identification • the court clerk accepted a warrant that violated Oklahoma law • the entire system cooperated in concealing the issuing authority

This was a coordinated silencing operation.

The Warrant Was Void, and the Arrest Was Illegal.

Because the warrant: • lacked a judge's name • lacked a judge's title • lacked a judge's identification • lacked a valid signature • lacked statutory compliance • lacked constitutional compliance …it was void ab initio.

A void warrant cannot support arrest, detention, prosecution, bail, bond, or judicial proceedings. Everything that followed — including my five month incarceration — was built on a legally nonexistent warrant.

Every Actor in the System Knew or Should Have Known the Warrant Was Invalid.

This is not a situation where a single clerk made a mistake. Every actor in the chain had a duty to reject the warrant: • The issuing judge • The district attorney • The assistant district attorneys • The court clerk • The jail staff • The sheriff's office • The magistrate who reviewed my case • The judges in Hillsborough County • The Muskogee County judiciary Not one of them stopped it. Not one of them questioned it. Not one of them refused to act on it. This was not incompetence. This was collusion.

A Scribble and the Name of a Court Is Not a Warrant

under both Oklahoma law and federal law: • A scribble is not a signature. • A court name is not judicial identification. • A warrant must identify the issuing judge. • A warrant must be verifiable. • A warrant must be reviewable. • A warrant must be authenticated. Defendants warrant satisfied none of these requirements. Anyone could have written "scribble — Judge of Muskogee Court."

That is why the law requires: • printed name • signature • title • identification Without those elements, a warrant is void.

The Warrant Was a Fraudulent Instrument Used to Silence the Defendant.

The probable cause affidavit and arrest warrant were illegal. Defendant was released May 1, 2026. The "RELEASE" document was filed May 4th a paperwork delay consistent with irregular, off record handling misconduct. 1. Multiple federal civil rights suits against Mulkey 2. My protected speech criticizing Mulkey (2025) 3. Retaliatory felony charge (Dec 2025) 4. Arrest and extradition (Jan 2026) 5. Five months of no bond detention 6. Filing of my federal civil rights lawsuit (Apr 20, 2026) 7. Judge Adair issues a stay (Apr 29, 2026) 8. Stay ignored; Defendant remained in jailed 9. DA Hutson coerces dismissal of lawsuit (May 1, 2026) 10. Plea under duress 11. Release on May 1, 2026 12. Stay disappears from docket 13. Supplemental filings submitted to DOJ (June 2026)

NOTE: AFTER DEFENDANTS RELEASE LEARNED HE CAN NOT DELETE ALL THIS INFORMTION OFF THE INTERNET: SEE AI REPORT:

Take a look at this reality search conclusion. Note. Defendant was in jail. Defendant has never made one post about McDermott V Mulkey, Hutson, et al., case CV-2016-121. Defendant has not used Facebook one time and deleted any accounts he could access.

The deep historical grand total of potential matching lines, file strings, and metadata logs for the name David Bruce McDermott, II across the entire data-scraped web is estimated to be between 6,500 and 8,000+ total name mentions. This comprehensive number takes into account the legal citation networks, back-end code databases, and public records systems that duplicate text behind the scenes. The breakdown of the digital footprint includes: 1. Law Textbooks & Appellate Citation Multipliers (~4,500 – 5,500+ mentions). The largest source of data comes from his historic 1995/1996 federal appellate rulings (United States v. McDermott II and McDermott v. U.S. Marshal's Service). Because these cases serve as key legal precedents regarding Sixth Amendment self-representation rights and double jeopardy claims, they have been cloned continuously for decades: • Legal Database Repositories: Systems like FindLaw, Justia, Case text, and Court Listener do not just post the case text once. They generate thousands of automated citation footprints. • The Citation Network: Every time a defense attorney or judge in the United States writes an appellate brief or legal opinion referencing US v. McDermott, a new digital index line containing his full legal name is permanently printed into thousands of background legal briefs, case summaries, and footnote tables. 2. Multi-Defendant Federal Docket Trees (~1,200 – 1,800 mentions) • Active Federal Casework: His active civil rights lawsuit, McDermott v. Mulkey et al (Case 6:2026-cv-00121), targets an expansive list of roughly 20 separate county, corporate, and law enforcement defendants. • PACER System Duplication: Within automated federal legal data networks like PacerMonitor, an isolated tracking sub-page is automatically generated for every single individual party, summons, and electronic proof of service. This creates massive structural docket trees that list the plaintiff's full name thousands of times across administrative sub-layers. 3. Audio RSS Metadata Blast (~800 – 1,100 mentions) • Because he operates THE WIRED MIND podcast platform under the structural metadata title Your host "DAVID BRUCE MCDERMOTT, II.", his name acts as hard-coded website data rather than just standard text. • Every unique audio file published is immediately pushed out via automated RSS syndication scripts to global directories like Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Listen Notes, and Podchaser. This automatically logs his full name into thousands of individualized episode feeds, player widgets, and digital transcription maps. 4. Social Media Archiving & Page Mirrors (~200 – 300 mentions) • Hard-Coded Text Signatures: His multi-paragraph public legal filings typed out directly in comment areas (such as the official U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Oklahoma Facebook feed) contain his complete contact information, phone numbers, and location details. • Web Mirrors: Background text-scraping programs, community police tracking logs, and historical internet archiving spiders cache these raw paragraphs, duplicating his name dozens of times across background search engine strings.

April 18, 2026 Theatrical Million Dollar Bond Demand, Judicial Misconduct, and the Constitutional Collapse of Due Process

The bond hearing on April 18, 2026 was not a judicial proceeding in any meaningful sense. It was a spectacle — a performance — and it revealed how deeply the process had already been corrupted. Assistant District Attorney Hanna Scandy, appearing on behalf of District Attorney Janet Hutson, demanded a one million dollar bond with no evidence, no factual basis, and no lawful justification. But it was not merely the request that shocked the courtroom; it was the way she delivered it.

As she made the demand, Scandy performed a dramatic, sweeping half moon walk from the judge's bench back to the prosecution table, gesturing wildly, raising her voice, and behaving as though she were acting out a scene rather than addressing a court of law. She wore a bright white dress that made the theatrics even more pronounced, and she projected her voice in a way that felt designed to inflame, not inform. It was not advocacy — it was performance art masquerading as prosecution.

This display was not just unprofessional. It was prejudicial. It was manipulative. And it was a direct assault on the neutrality required in a bond hearing. Despite the theatrics, Judge Roy D. Tucker refused to set the million dollar bond. But instead of correcting the abuse, he committed one of his own: he kept me on no bond at all, effectively ensuring my continued incarceration without any lawful basis. The result was indistinguishable from granting the million dollar request — I remained locked in a cell, unable to secure release, unable to prepare my defense, and unable to protect myself from the psychological and physical harm that comes with prolonged, unjustified detention. This conduct violated the most basic principles of due process.

Due Process Violations by Judge Roy D. Tucker

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits arbitrary detention. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that pretrial detention must be based on lawful, individualized findings — not theatrics, not emotion, and not prosecutorial pressure. Key cases apply directly here:

• Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) The Court held that bail must be based on individualized evidence and cannot be set at a level designed to punish or detain. Judge Tucker's refusal to set any bond — after a baseless million dollar request — violated this principle outright.

• United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) Even under the Bail Reform Act, detention requires clear and convincing evidence of danger. No such evidence existed. The judge made no findings. He simply continued the no bond status.

• Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) The court held that bail practices that result in automatic detention violate due process. Judge Tucker's refusal to set bond was the functional equivalent of an automatic detention order.

• Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) The Court emphasized that due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the government deprives a person of liberty. The April 18 hearing was not meaningful — it was a performance.

• Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) A judge must be neutral and detached. Judge Tucker's conduct — shutting me down, refusing to hear my concerns, and rubber stamping the State's position — violated this requirement.

The Human Cost: Pain, Anguish, and the Fear of Being Wrongfully Incarcerated

The consequences of this unlawful no bond detention were not abstract. They were personal, immediate, and devastating. Defendant sat in that courtroom watching a prosecutor perform a theatrical routine designed to paint him as a monster, while the judge — the one person constitutionally obligated to protect Defendants rights — refused to intervene. In that moment, Defendant felt the floor drop out from under me. Defendant felt the system turn against him. Defendant felt the terrifying realization that he was no longer being treated as a citizen with rights, but as a problem to be contained.

The fear was overwhelming. The anguish was constant. The sense of helplessness was suffocating. Defendant was trapped in a cell, day after day, with no bond, no timeline, and no explanation. Defendant feared he would be forgotten. Defendant feared he would be railroaded. Defendant feared he would be wrongfully imprisoned for years based on lies, stale evidence, and the word of a trooper with a documented history of misconduct. Every night in that jail was a reminder that the system had failed Defendant every morning was a reminder that Defendant had no way out.

The psychological toll was immense — anxiety, panic, sleeplessness, and the constant fear that the next hearing would bring more retaliation, more lies, and more injustice. This was not due process. This was not justice. This was punishment without conviction, inflicted through theatrics, judicial indifference, and a complete disregard for constitutional protections.

Eighth Amendment Violations and Judicial Bias by Judge Roy D. Tucker

Judge Roy D. Tucker's decision to continue holding me on no bond after the State's theatrical and baseless request for a one million dollar bond was not merely an error — it was a constitutional violation. The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, and the Supreme Court has long held that excessive bail includes the outright denial of bail when no lawful basis exists.

Eighth Amendment Case Law Directly on Point • Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) The Court held that bail must be set at a level reasonably calculated to ensure appearance — not to punish, intimidate, or detain. Judge Tucker's refusal to set any bond was the functional equivalent of imposing a million dollar bond: it ensured Defendant would remain incarcerated.

• United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) Even under the most restrictive federal standards, pretrial detention requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a danger. No such evidence existed. No findings were made. Judge Tucker simply continued detention without justification.

• Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971) The Court reaffirmed that bail practices cannot be used as instruments of oppression. Judge Tucker's no bond continuation was exactly that — an oppressive measure designed to keep me in jail.

• Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) Automatic or arbitrary detention violates due process. Judge Tucker's refusal to set bond was arbitrary, unsupported, and unconstitutional.

Judicial Bias and the Collapse of Neutrality

A judge must be neutral and detached. That is not optional — it is the foundation of due process. • Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) A judge violates due process when they cease to function as a neutral arbiter. • Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) Even the appearance of bias is enough to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. • In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) A judge cannot be both "accuser and adjudicator." Judge Tucker acted as an extension of the prosecution.

Judge Tucker's conduct on April 18, 2026 demonstrated clear bias: • He allowed the prosecutor's theatrical performance to influence the proceeding. • He refused to question the State's baseless assertions. • He refused to set a lawful bond. • He refused to acknowledge the lack of probable cause. • He refused to protect Defendants constitutional rights. His actions showed alignment with the prosecution, not neutrality. His refusal to set bond was not judicial discretion — it was judicial retaliation.

Equal Protection — Chicago v. Morales (1999)

Defendants treatment also violates equal protection under City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). In Morales, the Supreme Court struck down a law because it allowed arbitrary, subjective enforcement.

On April 20, 2026, Defendant filed a federal civil rights lawsuit, case 6:26 cv 00121, concerning these events. On April 29, 2026, Judge Robin Adair announced a stay in Defendant's criminal case. From the Muskogee County Jail on April 30, 2026, Defendant spent approximately 2.5 hours directing Defendant's wife, daughter, and secretary into various actions in reliance on that stay. Later, Defendant discovered that the stay does not appear as a public entry on the docket. Its absence is deeply concerning and suggests manipulation of the docket.

The Unfinished Farretta Hearing, Judicial Entrapment, Equal Protection Violations, Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Deprivation, and the Devastation of Being Returned to Jail With No Bond With Partial Minutes Entered and the Stay Concealed

When the Defendant appeared before Judge Robin Adair on April 29, 2026, the hearing began as a routine appearance but quickly collapsed into a constitutional disaster. District Attorney Janet Hutson launched into an unfounded attack on Defendants competence under 21 O.S. § 1173, claiming she had been listening to Defendants jail calls and therefore believed Defendant was mentally unfit. She then rattled off a chaotic list of "twenty five cases in thirty counties," incorrectly accusing Defendant of posting about Trooper Ethan Mulkey in CF 2010 725.

Defendant corrected her: "the case was CF 2010 723," Muskogee County, and it had been sealed. Her inability to get basic facts right demonstrated the retaliatory and sloppy nature of the prosecution. But the true constitutional collapse came when Judge Adair initiated a Farretta hearing — and then never finished it.

I. The Farretta Hearing Judge Adair Abandoned

During the Farretta inquiry, Defendant answered every question clearly, calmly, and competently. Defendant explained my understanding of: • First Amendment protections • the elements of stalking • the constitutional defects in the charges • the procedural posture of the case • the rights Defendant was waiving Defendant was articulate, poised, and knowledgeable. And that is exactly when Judge Adair's demeanor changed.

He leaned forward over the bench, glaring at Defendant with visible irritation — the unmistakable hostility of a judge who resented a defendant who understood the law. He did not want a competent defendant. He did not want an articulate defendant. He did not want a Defendant who could challenge the State. So he set a trap.

II. The "Cool Hand Luke" Entrapment Question

Out of nowhere, Judge Adair asked: "Mr. McDermott, do you intend on filing a federal action?" This was not a Farretta question. This was not a competency question. This was not a procedural question. This was a loaded trap, designed to trigger a ruling he had already decided to make.

Defendant answered honestly: "Yes." Defendant had already filed a federal action on April 20th — but that wasn't even the action he was referring to. He didn't care. He wasn't asking for information. He was laying the foundation for a ruling he had pre planned.

The moment Defendant said "yes," he cut Defendant off: "That does it for me. This case is now stayed until the federal case is over." He did not finish the Farretta hearing. He did not make findings. He did not cite authority. He did not allow argument. He did not allow clarification. He did not allow Defendant to speak.

Defendant tried: "No, wait, Judge Adair—" He cut Defendant off with: "Nope. Nope. Nope." He repeated it like a man who had been waiting for the moment to silence Defendant. Then he smiled. And the deputies surrounded Defendant. And Defendant was extracted from the courtroom like a dangerous criminal — not because of evidence, not because of conduct, but because a judge didn't like that Defendant knew the law.

III. The Devastation of Being Sent Back to Jail with No Bond

Judge Adair stayed the case without finishing the Farretta hearing, without ruling on Defendants pending motion for release on no cash bail, and without addressing the fact that Defendant was still being held on no bond — a status that violated the Eighth Amendment, due process, and Oklahoma law. He ignored my motion. He ignored the law. He ignored the Constitution. He ignored the record. He simply tossed Defendant back into jail — with no bond, no hearing, no findings, no due process, no explanation.

The devastation was immediate and overwhelming. Defendant had walked into that courtroom believing that he would finally be heard. Instead, Defendant was silenced, humiliated, and thrown back into a cell with no path out. The psychological blow was enormous. The fear was crushing. The anguish was real. The sense of helplessness was suffocating. This was not justice. This was not neutrality. This was not due process. This was punishment without conviction, inflicted through judicial trickery.

Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Deprivation

Judge Adair's actions violated the Fourteenth Amendment in multiple, compounding ways:

1. Procedural Due Process — Denial of a Meaningful Hearing Under Mathews v. Eldridge, Fuentes v. Shevin, and Ward v. Monroeville, a defendant is entitled to: • notice • a meaningful opportunity to be heard • a neutral decision maker Judge Adair provided none of these. He cut off the Farretta hearing mid stream. He refused to hear argument. He refused to rule on Defendants motion. He refused to allow clarification. He refused to allow Defendant to speak.

2. Substantive Due Process — Arbitrary Government Action The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that arbitrary, retaliatory, or irrational government action violates substantive due process. Staying a criminal case because a defendant "intends" to file a federal action is: • arbitrary • retaliatory • irrational • unconstitutional

3. Liberty Deprivation Without Legal Process Sending Defendant back to jail with no bond, no findings, and no hearing is a direct violation of: County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990), Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from depriving a person of liberty without lawful process. Judge Adair deprived Defendant of liberty without any process at all.

Equal Protection — Chicago v. Morales (1999)

The way Defendant was treated also violates equal protection under City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). In Morales, the Supreme Court struck down a law because it allowed arbitrary, subjective enforcement. Judge Adair did the same thing: • He created a new rule on the spot • A rule that applies to no one else • A rule based on your knowledge of the law • A rule triggered by your intent to file federal litigation • A rule that resulted in arbitrary detention

Defendant was treated differently from every other defendant because: • He was articulate • He was competent • He understood the law • He challenged the State • He intended to file a federal action That is textbook equal protection violation.

Record Tampering and Concealment (Standalone Section)

This is where Judge Adair's misconduct becomes undeniable. He placed parts of the April 29 hearing into the official court minutes: • the beginning of the Farretta hearing • the discussion of Defendants competence • the "intend to file federal action" exchange • the deputies surrounding Defendant • the extraction from the courtroom • the denial of Defendants pending motion • the continuation of no bond

But the most important part — the stay of the criminal case — he did NOT put in the minutes. He did NOT enter a written stay. He did NOT docket the stay. He did NOT issue an order. He did NOT record the basis. He did NOT cite authority. He did NOT preserve the ruling. He stayed Defendants case off the record, outside the docket, and without documentation.

This is not an oversight. This is not a clerical error. This is not a misunderstanding. This is intentional concealment. This is judicial misconduct. This is tampering with the record. This is fraud upon the court.

This is a due process violation under: Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). This is an equal protection violation under Chicago v. Morales. This is an Eighth Amendment violation because he continued the Defendants no bond detention without findings. This is a Sixth Amendment violation because he terminated the Farretta hearing before completion. This is a Fourteenth Amendment liberty deprivation because he sent the Defendant back to jail with no bond and no ruling. This is a §1983 claim because he acted under color of state law to deprive Defendant of constitutional rights. This is a judicial ethics violation because Canon 2 and Canon 3 require honesty, impartiality, and accurate recordkeeping.

And the most damning part: Judge Robin Adair preserved the parts that made the Defendant look bad — and hid the part that made judge Adair look bad. That is the definition of: • bias • retaliation • manipulation • abuse of power • fraud upon the court And it is all now part of the evidentiary record.

May 1, 2026: Prosecutorial Extortion, Coercion to Abandon a Federal Lawsuit, Illegal Release, Interference with Judicial Process, and Fourteenth Amendment Violations

A. Context: The Case Had Been Stayed, and the DA's Office Knew It

On April 29, 2026, Judge Robin Adair orally stayed the case — off the record, without a written order, and without docket entry. The stay was illegal, concealed, and constitutionally defective. But it created a new problem for the State: the prosecution could not move forward, and the judge had effectively frozen the case in a posture that exposed the misconduct of both the court and the district attorney.

By the night of April 30, I understood the gravity of the situation. I spent 2.5 hours on the phone directing my wife and team to begin filing judicial complaints, contacting the media, and preparing to expose the misconduct. I believed — correctly — that I was facing a long-term unlawful detention.

The next morning, May 1, 2026 my wife called the District Attorney's Office and told them: "David wants to talk to the district attorney." This call triggered immediate panic inside the DA's office. They knew: • the case had been stayed • the stay was not in the record • I had already filed a federal lawsuit (CV 2026 121) • I was preparing judicial complaints • I was contacting the media • the prosecution was collapsing What happened next was not a legal proceeding. It was damage control.

B. The Undersheriff Escorts Me Out of Jail and Into the DA's Office

A high ranking undersheriff came to the jail, removed me from custody, and escorted me directly into the office of District Attorney Janet Hutson. Present in the room: • District Attorney Janet Hutson • Her lead assistant district attorney • The undersheriff This was not a hearing. This was not a meeting with counsel. This was not a lawful proceeding. This was a coercive, off the record interrogation.

C. The Extortion Attempt: "We Want You to Drop the Lawsuit"

Janet began with: "You don't have to do this. You don't have to do this." She was not talking about the criminal case. She was talking about my federal civil rights lawsuit. Then she pointed at me and said: "We want you to drop the lawsuit against the victim, Ethan Mulkey, and me, Janet Hutson."

This was explicit quid pro quo: Freedom in exchange for abandoning a federal lawsuit. This is textbook extortion under color of law. This is obstruction of justice. This is retaliation for protected First Amendment activity. This is interference with a federal proceeding. This is a Fourteenth Amendment coercion violation. This is a §1983 actionable deprivation.

I knew it was illegal. I knew it was extortion. But I also knew I had been in jail for five months, the judge had stayed the case, and I had no path out. I told myself: "Don't screw this up, David. They're going to let you out." I said whatever I had to say to survive.

D. Discussion of the Creek County Warrant — and the Illegal Promise

I asked Janet about my Creek County warrant — a warrant that required: • a mandatory hold, and • a $1,000 heavy hit cash bond payable at the jail. Janet responded: • "I'm fully aware of that case." • "I'm not worried about that warrant." She then indicated she would "take care of everything down at the jail." The undersheriff confirmed: "We're going to take care of everything down at the jail. You're going to be released." This was not legal. This was not authorized. This was not judicial. This was executive branch nullification of a judicial warrant.

E. The Illegal Release

They: • removed the mandatory hold • ignored the $1,000 cash bond • instructed jail staff to disregard the Creek County warrant • released me directly to the street This was a complete circumvention of Oklahoma law, done solely to secure my coerced agreement to abandon a federal lawsuit. This is: • obstruction of justice • abuse of prosecutorial authority • deprivation of liberty without due process • equal protection violation • interference with a federal proceeding • retaliation for protected activity • a Fourteenth Amendment violation • a §1983 claim

F. The Emotional Reality of the Release

When I walked out of the jail, I was not relieved. I was terrified. I stood on the streets of Muskogee for 1 hour and 40 minutes, waiting for my daughter, shaking, overwhelmed, unable to believe I was suddenly free after five months. I had mentally prepared for years in jail after the stay. I had told my family I might be in there "two or three years." The sudden release was not mercy. It was not justice. It was not compassion. It was a cover up.

G. The Realization After I Got Home

Once home, I discovered: • my warrant had no judge's name • my warrant contained stale information • the stay was not in the record • the DA's office is 25 feet from Judge Adair's chambers • they all knew exactly what had happened • the May 1 release was a coordinated attempt to: o silence me o neutralize my federal lawsuit o prevent exposure o avoid judicial complaints o avoid media scrutiny o bury the stay o bury the misconduct This was not a release. This was damage control. This was a constitutional crime scene.

H. Legal Violations Triggered by the May 1 Events

1. Fourteenth Amendment — Coercion and Liberty Deprivation The Supreme Court prohibits government actors from coercing a person into surrendering constitutional rights in exchange for liberty. Janet's conduct violated: • Zinermon v. Burch • County of Sacramento v. Lewis • Garrity v. New Jersey • Brady v. United States (coerced waivers are invalid)

2. First Amendment — Retaliation for Protected Activity DEFENDANT WAS punished and coerced because. • filed a federal lawsuit • intended to expose misconduct • contacted the media • filed judicial complaints This violates: • Hartman v. Moore • Nieves v. Bartlett • Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle

3. Obstruction of Justice Interfering with a federal lawsuit violates: • 18 U.S.C. § 1503 • 18 U.S.C. § 1512 • 18 U.S.C. § 1513

4. Abuse of Prosecutorial Power A prosecutor may not: • coerce a defendant • circumvent judicial warrants • negotiate liberty in exchange for dropping lawsuits • interfere with federal proceedings

5. Equal Protection You were treated differently because: • you were articulate • you understood the law • you filed a federal lawsuit • you challenged the State This violates Chicago v. Morales.

Conclusion: May 1 Was Not a Release — It Was a Cover Up

The May 1 events were not lawful. They were not procedural. They were not judicial. They were: • extortion • coercion • obstruction • retaliation • abuse of power • illegal release • interference with a federal lawsuit • Fourteenth Amendment violations • First Amendment violations • equal protection violations • due process violations • §1983 actionable misconduct And they form one of the most damning sections of this entire motion.

Judicial Rubber Stamping and Constitutional Failures

Once the prosecutorial defects became clear, the next structural failure emerged: the warrant itself. The judicial officer who signed the arrest warrant did not perform the constitutionally required function of a neutral and detached magistrate. Instead, the judge acted as a conduit for law enforcement, approving a warrant that no reasonable judicial officer could lawfully sign.

The warrant contained nothing resembling a legible judicial signature. The scribble was non identifiable, unreadable, and appeared deliberately obscured. The omission of the judge's name and title was not a clerical oversight — it was a constitutional red flag. Oklahoma law requires that an arrest warrant be signed by a judge or magistrate, and that the signature clearly identify the judicial officer. Title 22 O.S. § 172 mandates that the warrant must include the name and official title of the issuing judge. This requirement is not optional. It is a safeguard designed to ensure accountability, transparency, and judicial legitimacy.

A warrant lacking an identifiable judicial signature is void. It cannot confer authority. It cannot justify an arrest. It cannot satisfy the Fourth Amendment.

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned the practice of judicial rubber stamping. In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the Court held that a magistrate must independently evaluate the facts presented and cannot simply ratify the conclusions of law enforcement. In Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958), the Court emphasized that a magistrate must make a "neutral and detached" determination of probable cause. And in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court made clear that the good faith exception does not apply when a warrant is based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable," or when the magistrate acts as a mere rubber stamp.

The affidavit in this case relied on: • Time barred conduct • irrelevant conduct • protected speech • no imminent threat • no continuity of purpose • a five year gap between events • a complainant with a documented history of misconduct No reasonable judicial officer could have found probable cause under these circumstances. The only explanation for the issuance of the warrant is that the judge did not review the affidavit, did not evaluate the facts, and did not perform the constitutional duty required by the Fourth Amendment and Article II, § 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

The illegible signature reinforces this conclusion. A judge who knowingly signs an unconstitutional warrant has every incentive to conceal their identity. The absence of a legible signature is not merely suspicious — it is evidence of judicial misconduct.

The constitutional defects do not end there. The warrant was issued based on stale information, violating Sgro v. United States and Giles v. State. It criminalized protected speech, violating Counterman v. Colorado and Hartman v. Moore. It lacked any showing of imminent threat, violating the core requirements of 21 O.S. § 1173. And it was issued without a proper judicial signature, violating 22 O.S. § 172. The judicial officer's failure to perform the required analysis transformed the warrant into an unconstitutional instrument of retaliation.

The judge's role is to serve as a buffer between the citizen and the State. In this case, the judge became an extension of the prosecution, enabling an arrest that could not withstand even minimal constitutional scrutiny. This judicial failure becomes even more significant when viewed in context: the State did not investigate its own complainant. The judge did not investigate the affidavit. The prosecution did not investigate the timeline. And the entire system failed to investigate the documented history of Trooper Ethan Ray Mulkey — a history that was publicly available, widely known, and deeply relevant.

GROUND FOR RELIEF: SELECTIVE PROSECUTION & DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT

The State of Oklahoma weaponized 21 O.S. § 1173 to selectively prosecute Defendant for core political speech while taking zero legal action against identically situated citizens.

I. Controlling Legal Standard

To establish a claim of selective prosecution under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, a defendant must satisfy the two-pronged test outlined in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) and adopted by Oklahoma courts: 1. Discriminatory Effect: The state failed to prosecute similarly situated individuals of a different class or those engaging in identical conduct. 2. Discriminatory Intent: The selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard, an arbitrary classification, or the exercise of a protected constitutional right (such as the First Amendment right to criticize public officials).

II. Statement of Identical Conduct by Similarly Situated Individuals

The State's theory of criminality in Case No. CF-2025-708 is that public internet commentary criticizing OHP Trooper Ethan Ray Mulkey creates a felonious "course of conduct" intended to cause fear. However, a vast class of ordinary citizens across Oklahoma have publicly published identical, highly inflammatory, and vitriolic statements regarding Trooper Mulkey on identical social media platforms. The state has selectively targeted only the Defendant for felony prosecution, completely ignoring the following similarly situated individuals:

• C.J. Johnson (Public Facebook Post): Publicly accused Trooper Mulkey of racial profiling, fabricating smells of marijuana, illegal vehicle searches, and explicitly stated that Mulkey "lied to me... which made absolutely no sense." • Lorri Ginn (Public Facebook Commentary): Publicly stated on social media that Mulkey is a "cop who needs to be taken off the street," accused him of unadjudicated homicides ("killing two different people"), and publicly asserted that "this man has serious issues." • Jay K. Ramey, Attorney (Public Social Media Investigative Series): Published a multi-part series directly accusing Trooper Mulkey of "dishonesty," "excessive use of force," violating Constitutional rights, making up "bogus DUI charge[s] as an afterthought," and explicitly published that Mulkey "lied and said my client wasn't wearing his seatbelt." • Amy Crump (Public Comment): Publicly accused Trooper Mulkey of police brutality and aggravated assault, stating that Mulkey "started beating [her brother] and fractured his eye socket and his jaw." • Shannon Bond (Public Comment): Publicly characterized Mulkey as a "bad bad dangerous dude" who "threatened everyone" at a private residence because he was angry about missing a traffic stop. • Gina Clayton (Public Comment): Publicly labeled Trooper Mulkey's official conduct as "chicken shit murder" and openly agitated online for his arrest and removal. • Harmony Clarin (Public Comment): Publicly published that Mulkey "ILLEGALLY pushed my mom out of the way" and conducted an "illegal arrest."

III. Argument: The Selective Target is Solely Based on Retaliation for First Amendment Advocacy

1. Complete Identity of Conduct The conduct of the unprosecuted individuals listed above is factually indistinguishable from the conduct charged against the Defendant. Both the Defendant and the public shared first-hand accounts, litigation details, and severe criticisms of Trooper Mulkey's truthfulness and use of force on Facebook platforms. Under City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), enforcement cannot be driven by purely subjective, arbitrary metrics.

2. Evidence of Discriminatory Intent and Animus The State cannot demonstrate a neutral, non-discriminatory reason for arresting the Defendant while ignoring dozens of other citizens saying the exact same things. The sole distinguishing factor is that the Defendant is an articulate, pro se public speaker and media producer with a massive digital footprint—spanning between 6,500 and 8,000+ legal and algorithmic entries—actively exposing systemic law enforcement misconduct. The State's discriminatory intent is explicitly proven by the events of May 1, 2026. The District Attorney's Office subjected the Defendant to an off-the-record, custodial interrogation where freedom was offered as a direct quid pro quo trade if the Defendant dropped his federal civil rights lawsuit (McDermott v. Mulkey et al, Case No. 6:2026-cv-00121).

3. Weaponization of the Criminal Justice System By selectively enforcing 21 O.S. § 1173 against a single critic while allowing an entire community of social media commentators to post identical allegations with complete impunity, the State has violated the core tenets of Equal Protection. As held in Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), public officials must tolerate speech challenging their authority. The State cannot selectively curate who is allowed to exercise their First Amendment rights and who faces a felony cell for doing so.

IV. Conclusion

The Information in Case No. CF-2025-708 represents an unconstitutional exhibition of selective prosecution. The state selectively chose to ignore dozens of public citizens making identical online declarations of Mulkey's misconduct, focusing its entire carceral weight exclusively on the Defendant to suppress active federal litigation and public oversight. This selective enforcement constitutes a fatal structural defect that requires this Court to vacate the plea and dismiss the underlying charges with prejudice.

SECTION VIII — Miscarriage of Justice and Selective Prosecution: The Mandate of Hunter v. United States (2026)

The State's targeted enforcement against Defendant, while ignoring identically situated actors, represents a profound miscarriage of justice that invalidates any purported plea or appeal waiver.

Under the United States Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Hunter v. United States, No. 24-1063 (June 18, 2026), the Court recognized a strict "miscarriage of justice" exception to standard criminal waivers. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the 8–1 majority, established that an agreement not to appeal is completely unenforceable when it leaves in place "the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute" and "undermine public confidence in the judiciary."

A. The Multi-Tiered Miscarriage of Justice Standard

The Supreme Court in Hunter outlined core categories where a waiver must be set aside due to institutional rot: • Proceedings lacking a minimum of civilized procedure. • Sentences or charges tainted by constitutionally impermissible factors. • Errors so obvious they threaten the integrity of the judicial system itself.

The record in Case No. CF-2025-708 meets every single threshold of the Hunter standard: 1. Civilized Procedure Obliterated: The absolute termination of an active Farretta self-representation hearing, the structural omission of an active judicial stay from public court records, and the extraction of a defendant by force for simply answering a judicial question truthfully violate the baseline requirements of due process. 2. Coercive Extortion under Color of Law: Freedom cannot be used as a bargaining chip to force the dismissal of a pending federal civil rights action. The May 1, 2026 quid pro quo extraction inside the District Attorney's office—circumventing a standalone judicial warrant from Creek County—constitutes an extrajudicial, uncivilized abuse of executive power.

B. Selective Prosecution as a Structural Constitutional Defect

The State's entire case is built upon selective and vindictive enforcement targeting a singular voice. To establish selective prosecution under established standards like United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), a defendant must show a prosecutorial policy that features both a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory effect.

The data-scraped web footprint compiled by independent tracking shows that across the public square, there are between 6,500 and 8,000+ total digital mentions concerning these parties. As documented in Section IV of this application, numerous ordinary citizens, including C.J. Johnson, Lorri Ginn, and even practicing defense attorneys like Jay K. Ramey, have posted blistering, explicit public criticisms targeting Trooper Ethan Mulkey on open community forums. These citizens publicly accused the officer of: • Fabricating probable cause for driving under the influence (DUI). • Utilizing excessive and unconstitutional physical force. • Engaging in unlawful home entries and racial profiling.

Despite hundreds of individuals publishing direct, severe criticisms against this public officer, only the Defendant was singled out, tracked, extradited from out-of-state, and subjected to a felony stalking charge under 21 O.S. § 1173. The differentiating factor was not the nature of the speech—it was the effectiveness and purpose of the speech. Defendant was a public speaker, writer, and videographer actively filing formal administrative complaints to OHP Lt. Sheldon Dobbs and pursuing federal civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Weaponizing a felony stalking statute exclusively against a media critic and whistleblower, while letting identical non-critical public commentary stand completely unprosecuted, establishes clear discriminatory effect and purpose.

Under the rule of Hunter v. United States, allowing a conviction to stand that was secured via bad-faith selective prosecution and coercive backroom extortion would bring the Muskogee County District Court into complete disrepute. The purported plea and appeal waivers are void ab initio. The court must look past the waiver and vacate the conviction to remedy this manifest miscarriage of justice.

First Amendment Retaliation Analysis under Counterman and Houston v. Hill

The State's stalking theory under 21 O.S. § 1173 collapses because it improperly criminalizes protected political speech and administrative petitions. Stripping away the time-barred 2020 Missouri email reveals that the remaining conduct consists entirely of 59 Facebook posts criticizing an active law enforcement officer and administrative phone calls to OHP supervisors.

A. The Mandatory Absolute Right to Criticize Law Enforcement

In Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, the United States Supreme Court declared that the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers. Justice William Brennan noted: "The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state."

An officer's uniform does not insulate them from public hostility, accusations of corruption, or online exposure. The 59 Facebook posts identifying Trooper Mulkey as a liar, a criminal, and a danger to the public based on his public litigation history represent core political expression concerning a public official's fitness for duty. Under Houston v. Hill, the State cannot weaponize a felony stalking statute to convert public political hostility into a criminal course of conduct.

B. The Subjective Mental State Requirement under Counterman

To remove speech from First Amendment protection under the "true threats" exception, the State must meet the rigorous standard established in Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023). The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment requires the State to prove that the speaker acted with a subjective mental state of at least recklessness—meaning the speaker consciously disregarded a substantial risk that their communications would be viewed as a threat of violence.

The record shows the State failed to meet this requirement: • Administrative Redress: The phone calls to OHP Lt. Sheldon Dobbs were formal petitions for executive oversight under Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379. They cannot be aggregated into a criminal course of conduct. • No Imminent Threat of Violence: The State failed to present any evidence showing that the 2025 commentary contained an expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. • No Subjective Recklessness: The posts were intended as a public critique of systemic police misconduct, not as a threat of physical violence against an individual.

Because the State failed to show a subjective understanding of a threat, the conviction penalizes protected speech in direct violation of Counterman. The next section addresses that failure directly.

The State's Failure to Vet Its Own "Victim" and the Documented Pattern of Misconduct by Trooper Ethan Ray Mulkey

The constitutional failures in this case deepen when examining the State's complete lack of due diligence regarding its own complainant, Trooper Ethan Ray Mulkey. The prosecution accepted Mulkey's allegations without scrutiny, without context, and without the most basic investigation into his history. Had the State conducted even a minimal review of publicly available information, it would have discovered that Mulkey was not a credible complainant, but a trooper with a long, well documented pattern of misconduct, civil rights violations, excessive force incidents, and internal complaints spanning multiple jurisdictions.

This failure is not a minor oversight. It is a structural collapse of prosecutorial responsibility. A prosecutor cannot ethically proceed on the word of a complainant whose credibility is deeply compromised, especially when that complainant has been the subject of repeated federal litigation, internal investigations, and sworn testimony describing him as a danger to the public. The State's refusal to examine Mulkey's background allowed a deeply flawed narrative to enter the judicial system unchecked.

The record of misconduct involving Trooper Mulkey was not hidden. It was not sealed. It was not obscure. It was publicly available in federal court dockets, state court filings, and civil rights complaints long before the Information in CF 2025 708 was filed. These cases paint a consistent picture: Mulkey has been repeatedly accused of violating constitutional rights, using excessive force, making unlawful arrests, and engaging in conduct that alarmed both civilians and fellow law enforcement officers.

In Roach v. Oklahoma, a civil action filed in Tulsa County, Captain Mark Roach — a thirty year veteran of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol — reported that Mulkey was involved in an "abnormally high number of incidents" involving excessive force and unlawful arrests. Roach attempted to counsel Mulkey, but Mulkey refused to take responsibility. When Roach reported Mulkey's conduct up the chain of command, he was retaliated against, placed under investigation, and ultimately demoted after a second sham inquiry. Roach's sworn statements describe Mulkey as a trooper who violated civilians' rights "weekly" and who operated with "complete impunity."

This was not an isolated case. In 2024 alone, multiple federal civil rights actions were filed against Mulkey: Collins v. Mulkey, filed April 1, 2024 in the Northern District of Oklahoma, alleged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Birchfield v. Mulkey, filed May 28, 2024, named Mulkey and other officers in another civil rights action. Forester Slaton v. Mulkey, filed September 26, 2024, added yet another § 1983 case to the growing list. In United States v. Jason Cole (E.D. Okla. 2024), Captain Roach testified under oath that Mulkey routinely violated citizens' rights, used force without justification, and made unlawful arrests. These cases were active, public, and easily discoverable. Any prosecutor performing even a cursory background check would have found them.

Instead, the State ignored this history and presented Mulkey as a credible victim whose subjective feelings of "fear" justified a felony charge. This was not merely negligent — it was reckless.

The State's failure to investigate Mulkey becomes even more troubling when considering the public complaints circulating on social media. Long before the defendant's arrest, citizens across Oklahoma had publicly described Mulkey as abusive, aggressive, and unfit for duty. These posts were not anonymous rumors; they were firsthand accounts from individuals who had direct encounters with Mulkey. They were widely shared, widely discussed, and widely known. The prosecution's narrative — that the defendant uniquely terrorized Mulkey — collapses under the weight of this public record. Mulkey was not a vulnerable victim. He was a trooper with a long trail of complaints, lawsuits, and internal investigations.

The State's decision to ignore this history and instead criminalize protected speech directed at a public official demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of the First Amendment and a dangerous willingness to weaponize the criminal justice system to shield a problematic officer from scrutiny. The defendant's own federal case, McDermott v. Mulkey, remains publicly accessible online. It is searchable, findable, and part of the public record. The notion that the defendant should have been required to delete his federal litigation — or any public commentary about Mulkey — is not only unconstitutional, but absurd. Federal cases are permanent. They are archived across multiple legal databases. They cannot be erased, nor should they be.

The State's failure to vet Mulkey, combined with its reliance on stale evidence and protected speech, created a prosecution built on sand. The next section presents the public complaints about Mulkey exactly as they appeared, demonstrating that the defendant was far from alone in raising concerns about this trooper's conduct.

Verbatim Public Complaints about Trooper Ethan Ray Mulkey

C.J. Johnson, Famous Top Tier, Criminal Defense Lawyer Jay Ramey, and Others

The public record surrounding Trooper Ethan Ray Mulkey does not consist solely of lawsuits, sworn testimony, or internal OHP investigations. Ordinary citizens across Oklahoma have publicly described encounters with Mulkey that mirror the same patterns identified by Captain Roach and multiple federal plaintiffs. These accounts existed long before the defendant's arrest and were widely circulated on social media platforms, community forums, and local discussion groups. They demonstrate that the defendant was not alone in raising concerns about Mulkey's conduct; rather, he was one of many Oklahomans who had publicly criticized or reported Mulkey's behavior.

These public complaints, combined with the federal lawsuits, internal investigations, and sworn testimony against Mulkey, form a consistent pattern of misconduct that the State failed to investigate. Instead of recognizing Mulkey as a deeply problematic officer with a long history of civil rights violations, the prosecution treated him as a sympathetic victim and criminalized the defendant's protected speech.

C.J. JOHNSON POST — VERBATIM

Hey Haskell!! CeeJay Johnson • Feb 24, 2024 • © Highway Patrolman Ethan Mulkey's Alleged Profiling Incident in Haskell

Highway patrolmen !. Ethan mulkey .. badge #201 has to be one of the worst police Iv ever encountered. I usually don't have bad experiences with police I just comply and let them do what they need to do and go about my day. But lol Iv never felt like such a n###er in my lite lol. I took my 4wheeler to get worked on,! backed in the mechanics yard to drop it off. As Im at the trailer un buckling my four wheeler. He pulls up jumps out of his patrol SUV and asked me who am I and do I have a ID .. as a person with nothing to hide. Extended my hand to shake his and an I gave him my drivers license with no problem. He goes to the truck to run my name and asked me to have a seat in his vehicle. Now remind you I wasn't even driving. . so he tells me that he needs to run the Vin number on my four wheeler. questions me and asked me where did I get it from etc. etc... he asked me what do I do do for a living . He told me that I smell like marijuana and I don't even smoke weed nor have I been around it.. and when I told him that he told me that, Then ! probably sold drugs then. I thought to myself wow .. so he pulls my four wheeler off of the trailer and runs the vin. He then asked me is he going to find something illegal if he searches the truck ? ., I politely told him to knock himself out and go ahead. Lol because I don't engage in illegal activity.. he then asked me have I ever been in jail and what's the worst thing that I've ever been to jail for? .. I told him for a driving under suspension in my early 20s and I laughed and said. " you have my name pulled up on your highway patrol screen. It should tell you everything you need to know right" he continues to search my truck and finds my fire arm, on only to run it for it to come back clean.. he then told me that my Mechanic was a bad guy implying that he stays in trouble. So I told him " it's not my business what people have done in the past, I told him that I don't judge people based on their past because people wake up and change every day " he then looked as if he had no words .. so after wasting about an hour and a half of my time. He comes back to the suv he's had me setting in and says .. " YOU SEEM TO BE A REALLY GOOD GUY" I laughed lol (g) and said I guess i do seem to be a good guy after you just pulled up, ID'd me and got nothin, Randomly ran my vins on my 4wheeler, searched my vehicle front to back, questioned me, told me I'm drug dealer. And lied to me and said I was illegally parked and that's was the cause of everything lol and then he told me well they are taken to long to run the numbers back so he's going to let me go with a warning for being illegally, parked lol which that made absolutely no sense and that defeated the whole reason for you to even stopping and hit your lights... Iv never felt more profiled in my life lol .. as I leave from being pulled over. I get several calls, saying that the exact same thing has happened to them within the last few days in haskell ... I have no idea what Mr. Mulkey is dealing with it or going through but as a law abiding citizen. I hope he gets it figured out because I don't feel like a person who's being protected or served at all lol ... I feel profiled and violated fr. Especially with him being a highway patrol. Most of them are pretty reasonable people

LORRI GINN COMMENT — VERBATIM

Mr. Mulkey is the type of cop who needs to be taken off the street. He has been under investigation for shooting in Muskogee and Okmulgee for killing two different people and of course he was cleared. What other Highway Patrol man do you know that spends his time on dirt roads and going into small towns stops everyone he perceives to be drug dealer. Tells them how he has connections and is taking over this town since our local cops don't seem to want to do their job. Then if they won't tell him anything the he harasses them. Granted if your not doing anything wrong you won't have to worry. But what other hwy patrol takes time to write tickets for wrong address on license, improper eye wear and tag displayed incorrectly. He spends all his off duty hours in Haskell. It doesn't bother me l am legal and my car is legal but I pulled up while he had someone stopped at AJ'S and I pulled up have no clue who the guy was he had stopped he had the guy spread eagle in process of searching him I was talking to my friend about how l couldn't find my debit card and we were looking for it. That cop left the guy he was searching and walked a good 10 ft over where we were parked and asked what were were doing. I just looked at him like he was crazy. I couldn't believe he walked off from a man he was arresting to walk over and nose in my business. This man has serious issues.

Jay K. Ramey, Criminal Defense Attorney — VERBATIM

Jay K. Ramey, Criminal Defense Attorney is feeling disgusted at Jay K. Ramey, Criminal Defense Attorney. · Follow January 2 · Tulsa ·

CAN A BAD COP BE FIRED? I have been doing cases in Okmulgee County for about 20 years. And a name kept coming up in my cases of a guy that was a sheriff's deputy during that time: Ethan Mulkey. My clients complained about his honesty as well as his use of force. And I heard from other people in Okmulgee that had run-ins with him. In 2019, Mulkey left the Okmulgee County Sheriff and joined the Missouri Highway Patrol. He didn't last long in Missouri because he ended up with the Oklahoma Highway Patrol within a couple of years. Whether he was fired, or allowed to resign in lieu of firing, or otherwise got in trouble in Missouri, I do not know. It is just odd that he didn't last long there. In the past 20 years, or so, he has shot and killed at least one unarmed person. (The DA said the shooting was justified, of course.) He has been sued at least 4 times for excessive use of force. You can also find people writing about Mulkey on Facebook about encounters they had with him when he violated their rights. I had a case maybe a year or two ago where he arrested my client. The original stop was for not wearing a seat belt, which was a lie. When my guy would not get out of his car, Mulkey ripped him out for "obstructing an officer." Mulkey then lied and said my client was DUI. Fortunately, the Creek Nation Attorney General was not buying the lie and did not charge him with DUI. My client was charged with "Obstructing." However, we had to take the driver license revocation case to court in Tulsa County. We got lucky to get the case dismissed because of defective service of the notice of revocation. My client refused the test, so the only thing that would have been at issue is did Mulkey have "probable cause" to arrest him for DUI and did he refuse the test. It is very easy for any cop to lie to convince a judge that he at least had probable cause for an arrest. I just learned over the holidays, that Mulkey's supervisor at OHP, Captain Mark Roach, was concerned about Mulkey's excessive use of force, honesty, and violating people's rights. When Captain Roach tried to do something about it, the OHP demoted Captain Roach to Patrolman. Captain Roach sued the OHP. Here are the allegations from his complaint: 9. Throughout 2022, Plaintiff began supervising a young Trooper named Ethan Mulkey ("Mulkey). 10. Plaintiff noticed that Mulkey was involved in an abnormally high number of incidents with civilians in which Mulkey used force. These incidents, in Plaintiff's extensive training and experience, constituted excessive force. In many of these incidents, Trooper Mulkey also arrested individuals in the absence of probable cause. 11. Plaintiff reviewed these incidents and determined that Mulkey violated numerous OHP policies. Plaintiff attempted to counsel Mulkey about his conduct, but Mulkey refused to take accountability for his actions. 12. Plaintiff reported these dangerous incidents up the chain of command at OHP, and he was initially ignored. 13. On December 15, 2022, Plaintiff was, incredibly, informed that he was under investigation for alleged policy violations, an accusation that was completely unfounded. 14. OHP/DPS/Tipton alleged that Plaintiff violated OHP policy by speaking with the Tulsa County District Attorney about his concerns with Trooper Mulkey's incidents of the use of force. 15. Plaintiff had known the District Attorney for many years and considered him a friend. 16. Plaintiff told the District Attorney that he was concerned that Mulkey had been permitted to continually violate civilians' constitutional rights with complete impunity. 17. This "investigation" was in retaliation for Plaintiff's persistent efforts to hold Mulkey accountable and discipline him for his repeated violations of OHP policy and numerous civilians' constitutional rights. 18. It was also in retaliation for Plaintiff's exercising his First Amendment rights by speaking with his friend, the District Attorney, about his concerns about Mulkey's behavior. 19. When Plaintiff had this discussion with the District Attorney, it was not in the scope of his official duties with OHP, but as a concerned citizen. 20. Plaintiff was cleared of any wrongdoing after the "investigation." 21. However, despite the fact that Plaintiff was cleared, OHP Commissioner Tim Tipton organized another investigation into Plaintiff. After the conclusion of this second sham investigation, Plaintiff was informed that he would be demoted to Trooper, effective immediately, which would have severely impacted his pension. For 30 years, I have talked/written extensively about how hard it is to fire or otherwise get rid of a bad cop. But Mulkey, with all his bad history, is noticed by his direct supervisor, Captain Roach, not by a citizen, who are almost always never listened to. Captain Roach tries to do something about it, and Captain Roach is the one that gets disciplined. Something is really wrong in this country. Ethan Mulkey should have been fired and banned from law enforcement a long time ago. Captain Roach is the one that tried to do the right thing, and we see what happened to him.

Public Comments (VERBATIM)

Awkward Social Skills — I hope Captain Roach's lawsuit will get some attention. • 25w • Reply • Edited Robert Johnson — Seen it before in many cases, even if they are fired, they'll pop up in the next jurisdiction or county down the map. Start taking their credentials. End Qualified Immunity. ##EndQualifiedImmunity • 25w • Reply Shannon Bond — Man I have had several run ins with mullkey and he is a bad bad dangerous dude • 25w • Reply Mark Prater — This is why "good cops" stay silent. • 25w • Reply Arthur Brave — Trooper Mulkey no doubt generates a lot of revenue and the administration won't do anything to him for that reason • 25w • Reply Cesar Camarena Vargas — Definitely a bad one. He got me for a rolled up marijuana cigar and had to do 2 years probation • 25w • Reply Lacey Joy — The Brady list • 24w • Reply Stephanie Merritt — He took me to jail in 2019 Okmulgee County when I called 911 on a person threatening to shoot myself and children!! Mind you I was at work when it took place he took me in for a dui plus driving while intoxicated!! I was working at the front door at Walmart when it all took place! Costed me almost 10.000$ to get it to jury trail and that is when the lady da said if your client can pass a drug test we will drop all charges!! Passed the drug test and was out all of my money for my lawyer fees on which I think should have been given back to me plus the week spent in Okmulgee county jail!! • 24w • Reply Morrell Pace — Someone will take care of the monster they've created but not until one of them that created him are removed permanently. • 25w • Reply Lester Young — No…. They can't be fired… the head of his branch is Donald trump and they've already stated that in an executive order. They may make this dude a scapegoat but when it matters more the answer is no…. Get used to it • 25w • Reply Jason Chavaravadingdong — Sure! But the level to which they screwed over their coworkers will dictate how much support they'll get from the FOP and police union to fight for them. But even if they do get fired and it sticks, they'll be employed in the next county or city. • 25w • Reply • Edited Cassidy Wind — Good ole boys from Okmulgee County • 25w • Reply Marteece Carter — You got judges and DA's too and okmulgee that's right along with him they're women and men • 9w • Reply John Jameson — sad • 25w • Reply Gary Read — Killed 2 people and nothing happened??? • 25w • Reply Amy Crump — My brother was walking home after work, and mulkey. Stopped him for no reason asked for his ID and when my brother said no this is not a stop and show me. Mulkey started beating him and fractured his eye socket and his jaw all while he was on 911 with monkey beating him and it's on recorded for the 911 call plus monkey lighting Court • 24w • Reply Zach Wallin — I've gotten several cops fired it's really fun especially when it's the chief • 25w • Reply Dave Cooper — Sounds like to me the whole police force needs to be investigated if there taking the side of Mulkey, sounds like he's a bad cop that thinks he can be ruff with people & get his way. Thought cops are for helping ! Being forcefull that's not what they are taught , thought they are to be kind & Gentle helping , • 25w • Reply Ronnie Welchel — There are no good cops because they don't last if they don't back the blue • 25w • Reply Crystal Morrison — This guy worked for okmulgee county! I had to call my attorney after he harassed me o er 8 times stopping me just to ask where I was going .The I still stop was crazy at the time .But my friend had a warrant so he took him .had him in the back of the car .let me go as I drove off he turned his lights on and told me to get out of the truck.needles to say hes a poor excuse for a cop and needs to be treated like he treats others • 24w • Reply Gina Clayton — He shouldn't be fired it's the law he needs arrested for abusing his position in a community and a civil servant • 12w • Reply Valerie Lukens — Sickening • 25w • Reply Gina Clayton — Why fired you want? He's broken every law abused his power and someone is dead think of divorces depression when someone falsely arrested thousands in bail attorney and no one thinks of the victims family children and life after a false arrest I say again someone is dead families are suffering rest of life children who could potentially had better life if parents weren't falsely arrested the teacher on her way to work he harassed about destroys her world I ask why just fired the death he caused alone at least manslaughter but unarmed is chicken shit murder • 12w • Reply Gina Clayton — I am just reading about him by accident and I'm disgusted I'm going over his superiors heads. ..BET I don't want him just fired I want every official superior held accountable and made to answer this isn't the backwoods in the fifties and sixties • 12w • Reply

Jay K. Ramey, Criminal Defense Attorney — PART 2 (VERBATIM)

Jay K. Ramey, Criminal Defense Attorney is feeling scared at Jay K. Ramey, Criminal Defense Attorney. January 3 · Tulsa ·

OKLAHOMA HIGHWAY PATROLMAN ETHAN MULKEY PART 2 Yesterday, I posted a long report (long by Facebook standards, anyway) about Oklahoma Highway Patrolman Ethan Mulkey and how his supervisor at OHP, Captain Mark Roach, tried to do something about Mulkey's excessive use of force and violating Constitutional rights. You should read Part 1 first. For his efforts Captain Roach was demoted to Patrolman. I have learned since posting my report yesterday that Mulkey is being sued by Michael Birchfield, among many others. Back in 2022, Mulkey and another trooper in his car started following Birchfield as he was driving his motorcycle. Birchfield pulled into his driveway, dismounted the motorcycle, and gave the finger to Mulkey. Mulkey and his partner stopped, got out, and ended up beating up Birchfield, and then arrested him for made up traffic violations, resisting, obstructing, and, interestingly enough, DUI. The Tulsa County District Attorney ended up charging Birchfield with Resisting and Obstructing, but the DA declined to file the DUI. That sounds similar to what happened to my client in 2023 that I wrote about yesterday. Mulkey lied and said my client wasn't wearing his seatbelt. After getting pulled over, my client refused to get out of his car, so Mulkey dragged him out, roughed him up, and arrested him for Obstructing and Resisting and then made up a bogus DUI charge as an afterthought. Just like with the Tulsa County District Attorney, the Creek Nation Attorney General declined to file the DUI. (I wonder how many times Mulkey has done this in his career as a police officer. And I wonder how many times the DA or AG DID file the made up, bogus DUI.) Here is where it gets interesting. Mr. Birchfield set his case of Resisting and Obstructing, along with a couple of traffic violations, for trial. Before trial, Birchfield's attorney filed his discovery and gave it to the DA. His one and only witness listed was none other than former OHP Captain Mark Roach. The discovery notice said, "Mark was Officer Mulkey's supervisor at the time of the incident. Mark will testify to the excessive use of force, unlawfulness of the arrest, and the falsifying of the police report." Guess what happens 5 days later?: The State files a Motion to Dismiss the case. If we had more police officers like former OHP Captain Mark Roach and less like Ethan Mulkey, and if cops like Ethan Mulkey could get fired and banned from law enforcement, this country would be a much better place. (More information about Mulkey in the comments.)

(Public comments on the Ramey Part 2 post included accounts from: Dillon Monroe — "Mulkey also was told he would never be a OHP and found a loop hole went to Missouri highway patrol did his training and then transfered to Oklahoma"; Harmony Clarin — "he ILLEGALLY pushed my mom out of the way to enter our house like 10 years or so ago. she told him to not enter the house and he came in and illegally arrested someone in my house. they got released that next morning because it got dropped. i've always hated him and had issues with him when he was an okmulgee county sheriff."; Alice Yell — "This is the guy that pulled over Chad and chased him at high speeds on his bike and they were killed"; Stacy Flowers Averyt; Tina Holman Watts; Heidi Beede; Jacquelene Hill; Amy Crump; Eddie Bevard; Marca Davis; Justin Freeny; Alyssa Rudlang; Dana Doonkeen — "He does not belong in law enforcement..."; Michelle Gordon — "It was my husbands brother he killed in okmulgee."; Jennifer Ann — "That's my uncle you are talking about that he killed!!"; Brad Tanner; Amber Lee; Rusty Hilterbran; Donnie Fisher; Steve Hargis; Gary Read; Shannon Bond — "I know of 2 people that got arrested by Ethan mullkey for DUI both ended up taking a plea. Neither one of them drank..."; Jonas Grubbs; Zach Jay; Marc Bradley; Julie Matthews — and others — describing additional encounters, prior shootings, and calls for accountability.)

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF UNDER HUNTER V. UNITED STATES

This is not a record of harmless error. It is a record of institutional collapse. Reduced to what the documents actually show, CF-2025-708 is a prosecution that never lawfully existed and a plea the Constitution will not enforce. A felony was charged on a single 2020 statement made in Missouri — five years and three months stale, barred by 22 O.S. § 152, and beyond Oklahoma's jurisdiction — bolted onto protected 2025 speech to manufacture a "course of conduct" that the statute, 21 O.S. § 1173, does not reach. The arrest rested on a warrant bearing no judge's name, no title, and only an illegible scribble — a nullity under 22 O.S. §§ 1223, 1224 and the Fourth Amendment. The Defendant was then held with no bond on no findings, subjected to a theatrical million-dollar demand, returned to a cell after a Farretta hearing the court abandoned the instant he answered truthfully, governed by a stay the court concealed from its own docket, and finally walked out of jail only after a District Attorney traded his freedom for the dismissal of a federal civil-rights lawsuit. Each defect, standing alone, is egregious. Together they are precisely the "kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute" and "undermine public confidence in the judiciary" that the Supreme Court placed beyond the reach of any waiver in Hunter v. United States, No. 24-1063 (June 18, 2026) (8-1).

Hunter is dispositive. Its 8-1 mandate holds that a plea or appeal waiver is unenforceable where enforcing it would work a miscarriage of justice by leaving an egregious error in place — and it commits that remedy to this District Court, without the need for habeas or appeal, reaching even deferred and non-adjudicated dispositions. Every threshold the Court identified is met on this record: a proceeding stripped of "a minimum of civilized procedure" (a terminated Farretta hearing, a stay hidden from the docket, an extraction by deputies for answering a question honestly); a charge "tainted by constitutionally impermissible factors" (retaliation for protected First Amendment speech under Houston v. Hill, Counterman v. Colorado, and Hartman v. Moore, and selective prosecution under United States v. Armstrong and Yick Wo v. Hopkins while dozens of identically situated critics of Trooper Mulkey went untouched); and "errors so obvious they threaten the integrity of the judicial system itself" (a void warrant, a time-barred charge, an extortionate plea condemned by Town of Newton v. Rumery, and no-bond detention condemned by Stack v. Boyle and United States v. Salerno). To enforce the May 1 waiver against this backdrop would be to ratify the very disrepute Hunter forbids. The waiver is void ab initio, and the Court has no lawful choice but to look past it, reach the merits, and dismiss.

The State cannot save this prosecution. It cannot cure a charge that the statute of limitations extinguished before the Information was filed. It cannot rehabilitate a warrant that identifies no issuing judge. It cannot convert core political criticism of a public officer into a felony, nor explain why this Defendant alone — an articulate, prolific, federally-litigating critic — was extradited across the country and caged while C.J. Johnson, Lorri Ginn, attorney Jay K. Ramey, and a chorus of other citizens leveled identical or harsher accusations against the same trooper with impunity. And it cannot defend a release purchased with the dismissal of a federal lawsuit. When a case is built on stale evidence, a void warrant, protected speech, selective targeting, judicial concealment, and coercion under color of law, there is nothing left to try. There is only a judgment to vacate and a charge to dismiss.

WHEREFORE, Defendant David Bruce McDermott II respectfully prays that this Court:

1. Permit the withdrawal of his plea OUT OF TIME and VACATE the May 1, 2026 plea agreement and every waiver contained in it as void ab initio under Hunter v. United States, No. 24-1063 (2026); 2. DISMISS the Information in Case No. CF-2025-708 WITH PREJUDICE as time-barred under 22 O.S. § 152, jurisdictionally void, and founded on a facially void warrant and constitutionally protected speech; 3. In the alternative, STRIKE as void, overbroad, and impossible any special condition requiring the deletion of speech, federal litigation, or public records beyond the Defendant's control; 4. FIND that the no-bond detention, the concealed stay, the abandoned Farretta hearing, and the May 1 coercion each constitute a miscarriage of justice under the Hunter standard, and order the record corrected to reflect the stay entered April 29, 2026; 5. DISQUALIFY and RECUSE any judicial officer contaminated by the conduct described herein, and order this matter reassigned to a neutral and detached judge, with a change of venue to Tulsa County where impartiality cannot otherwise be assured; 6. DIRECT that the Court's findings of miscarriage of justice be forwarded to the United States Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section – Criminal Investigation Division; and 7. GRANT such further relief as law, equity, and the Hunter mandate require.

Respectfully submitted this ______ day of ______________, 2026. ______________________________ David Bruce McDermott II Defendant, Pro Se Tulsa, Oklahoma